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Williams v. Martin will exert only a slight impact on the appointment
of experts to assist indigent defendants. Certainly the decision sends a
clear signal to state trial judges that, on a proper showing, 53 they must
provide expert assistance at an indigent defendant's request. Thus Wil-
liams should persuade judges to provide experts in cases in which the
due process argument is not sufficiently persuasive.5 4 The Williams
rule also will promote the interests of judicial economy and greater effi-
ciency in the criminal process because it will eliminate the need for new
trials for indigent defendants denied effective assistance of counsel by a
trial court's refusal to provide an expert. Yet the overlap between the
equal protection and due process claims at the remedial stage may, in
practice, make the Williams equal protection analysis superfluous.55
TORTS-INTERSPOUSAL IMMUNITY-MAINE ALLOWS SUIT FOR PER-
SONAL INJURY BETWEEN HUSBAND AND WIFE. MacDonald v. Mac-
Donald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). In MacDonald v. MacDonald' a wife
sought damages from her former husband alleging that his negligent
provided an indigent defendant denied effective assistance of counsel, see notes 47-51 supra and
accompanying text, at least one court has indicated that the Williams test might produce a broader
remedy. In Pedrero v. Wainwright, 590 F.2d 1383 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 943 (1979), the
court said that the "decisions in the circuit ... strongly suggest that prejudice will be presumed if
the petitioner shows that the matter on which he needed the assistance of experts was seriously in
issue." Id at 1391 n.9. The "seriously in issue" formulation resembles the first tail of the test used
in Williams: The indigent must show that there is a substantial question which requires expert
testimony for its resolution. See notes 28, 36 supra and accompanying text. If prejudice is pre-
sumed once the defendant satisfies the test, the defendant need not demonstrate prejudice inde-
pendently on appeal absent evidence by the state which rebuts the presumption.
53. See notes 27-28 supra and accompanying text.
54. See notes 18-25 supra and accompanying text.
55. While the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has intimated that the standard might produce
new results, see note 52 supra, it has not yet so held, and the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Williams v. Martin, 618 F.2d 1021 (4th Cir. 1980), refused to extend the doctrine.
In addition, the proliferation of state statutes providing for expert assistance for indigent crimi-
nal defendants may diminish the present need to announce another constitutional right. Pres-
ently, at least 40 states-including all those within the Fourth Circuit-have provided for state
funding of expert assistance for indigents. See note 18 supra. Because courts should not decide
questions of constitutional law if there are other grounds on which a case may be decided, see
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), there should be no need
for the announcement of another constitutional right absent state standards for invoking the stat-
ute that are more stringent than those required by the Constitution.
1. 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980). Prusinski v. Prusinski, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980), was decided at
the same time on similar facts.
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operation of an automobile during their marriage caused her bodily
injury. 2 The trial court denied relief by relying on the rule of inter-
spousal tort immunity. On appeal, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
held: A person injured by the tortious conduct of a spouse can recover
from the tortfeasor in a civil action even though the tortious conduct
occurred during the marriage.'
The interspousal tort immunity rule originated in the common law of
England. The common law considered a husband and wife as a single
legal unit.- Because procedure compelled joinder of the husband in all
legal actions involving his wife, suits between spouses were impossible.6
In 1876, an English court in Phillps v. Barnett,' determined that even if
the courts resolved the procedural question, the unity of married
couples still would preclude suits between spouses.' Most American
courts adopted the common-law rule of interspousal immunity.9
The decline of interspousal immunity began in the mid-1800's with
2. The couple's two unemancipated minor chidren were also seeking damages. The trial
court rejected their claim based on the rule of parental immunity, which was later abrogated in
Black v. Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979).
3. MacDonald v. MacDonald, 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980).
4. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 859 (4th ed. 1971); McCurdy, Torts
Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 HARV. L. REv. 1030, 1031 (1930) [hereinafter cited as
McCurdy, Torts]; McCurdy, Personal lnjury Torts Between Spouses, 4 VILL. L. REV. 303, 304
(1959) [hereinafter cited as McCurdy, Personal Injury].
5. See I BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 442 (1769) which summarizes the common-law
view: "By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law: that is, the very being or legal
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consoli-
dated into that of the husband." Cf W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 859 (arguing that unity was
only important in a limited context).
6. See McCurdy, Torts, supra note 4, at 1033. The husband had the right to reduce all of
the wife's choses in action to possession. If he committed a tort against his wife, he could reduce
the chose in action to possession. The union of the right and the duty in the husband would
discharge the duty. If the woman committed the tort, the wife's duty would become a derivative
duty of the husband's which would be discharged by the union of the right and the duty in the
same person.
7. 1 Q.B.D. 436 (1876). In Phillips a husband assaulted his wife. After they were divorced,
the wife brought a suit for personal injuries. Justice Blackburn wrote:
I was at first inclined to think, having regard to the old procedure and the form of
pleas in abatement, that the reason why a wife could not sue her husband was a difficulty
as to parties; but I think that when one looks at the matter more closely, the objection to
the action is not merely with regard to the parties, but a requirement of the law founded
on the principle that husband and wife are one person.
Id at 438.
8. Id at 438.
9. See Comment, Tort Actions Between Members of the Family-Husband and Wife-Parent
and Child, 26 Mo. L. REV. 152, 153 (1961).
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the passage of Married Woman's Emancipation Acts in many jurisdic-
tions."' By the early 1900's all states had adopted these statutes." The
state legislatures intended these acts to allow women to own property.' 2
Few statutes expressly addressed the issue of interspousal tort immu-
nity.'3 Some courts, without specific guidance from the legislature, in-
terpreted the statutes to abrogate interspousal immunity.' 4  Other
courts, however, contended that the statutes did not deal with the im-
munity rule.' 5
10. W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 861. McCurdy, Personal Injury, supra note 4, summarizes
the content of typical statutes:
In most states it is provided that a married woman may (or can or shall) sue (or be
sued) as if (or in the same manner as if) single (or unmarried). In some of these states
she may sue, or be sued, "separately" or "without joinder of her husband." In some
[states] she may sue or be sued in her own name, or alone.. . . Torts may or may not be
mentioned. Some statutes expressly include them in general terms; some mention inju-
ries to person and character.
Id at 311.
II. See W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 861.
12. Id; Comment, supra note 9, at 154.
13. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 68, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1959); N.Y. GEN. OBLIo. LAW § 3-313
(McKinney 1978); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 52-55 (1976); Wis. STAT. § 246.075 (1971). See also FLA.
STAT. § 708.08 (Supp. 1980); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 460:2 (1968); VA. CODE § 55-36 (1950).
14. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917) (assault and battery);
Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963) (automobile negligence); Katzenberg v. Katzenberg,
183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931) (automobile negligence); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d
65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1962) (assault and battery); Rains v. Rains, 97 Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935)
(automobile negligence); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914) (assault and battery);
Loranz v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) (false arrest and false imprisonment); Brown v.
Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953) (automobile negligence); Hosko v. Hosko, 385 Mich. 39, 187
N.W.2d 236 (1971) (automobile negligence); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915) (as-
sault); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) (infection with venereal disease);
Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191,242 N.W. 526 (1932) (automobile negligence); Fiedeer v.
Fiedeer, 42 Okla. 124, 140 P. 1022 (1914) (assault with a shotgun); Prosser v. Prosser, 114 S.C. 45,
102 S.E. 787 (1920) (willful beating); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W. 266 (1941) (auto-
mobile negligence); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972) (negligent mainte-
nance of a tractor); Wait v. Pierce, 191 Wis. 202, 209 N.W. 475 (1926) (automobile negligence).
15. See, eg., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (assault and battery); Plotkin v.
Plotkin, 32 Del. 455, 125 A. 455 (1924) (conversion); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950)
(automobile negligence); Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167, 135 S.E.2d 522 (1964) (personal
injuries); Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952) (automobile negligence); Austin v. Aus-
tin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924) (automobile negligence); Rogers v. Rogers, 265 Mo. 200, 177
S.W. 382 (1915) (false imprisonment); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Leary, 168 Mont. 482,
544 P.2d 444 (1975) (automobile negligence); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922 (1932)
(automobile negligence); Emerson v. Western Seed & Irrigation Co., 116 Neb. 180, 216 N.W. 297
(1927) (automobile negligence); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955); Lillienkamp v.
Rippetoe, 133 Tenn. 57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915) (assault and battery); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14
Utah 2d 344,384 P.2d 389 (1963) (automobile negligence); McKinney v. McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204,
135 P.2d 940 (1943) (automobile negligence).
Washington University Open Scholarship
Number 1] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Most jurisdictions originally refused to allow interspousal suits, but
now only sixteen retain the restriction. 6 In those jurisdictions that
maintain interspousal immunity, the common-law unity of husband
and wife is no longer the primary justification for the rule. Current
supporters of the rule contend that it promotes family harmony 17 and
prevents the maintenance of frivolous'" or fraudulent suits. 19 A few
16. See 412 A.2d at 73 n.3. State court decisions that have not abrogated the immunity rule
include: Bums v. Bums, Ill Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974) (automobile negligence); Aifree v.
Alfree, 410 A.2d 161 (Del. 1979) (automobile negligence); Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla.
1979) (automobile negligence); Taylor v. Vezzani, 109 Ga. App. 167, 135 S.E.2d 522 (1964) (per-
sonal injury); Tugaeff v. Tugaeff, 42 Hawaii 455 (1958) (suit between husband and wife not au-
thorized); Steffa v. Stancey, 39 Ill. App. 3d 915, 350 N.E.2d 886 (1976) (automobile negligence);
Sink v. Sink, 172 Kan. 217, 239 P.2d 933 (1952) (personal injury); Smith v. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins.
Co., 247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965) (automobile negligence); McNeal v. Estate of McNeal, 254
So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971) (automobile negligence); Klein v. Aramson, 513 S.W.2d 714 (Mo. App.
1974) (failure to obtain prompt medical assistance); Conley v. Conley, 92 Mont. 425, 15 P.2d 922
(1932) (automobile negligence); Thomas v. Herron, 20 Ohio St. 2d 62, 253 N.E.2d 772 (1969)
(automobile negligence); Chaffin v. Chaffin, 239 Or. 374, 397 P.2d 771 (1964) (automobile negli-
gence); Wooley v. Parker, 222 Tenn. 104, 432 S.W.2d 882 (1968) (automobile negligence); Rubal-
cava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963) (automobile negligence); McKinney v.
McKinney, 59 Wyo. 204, 135 P.2d 940 (1943) (automobile negligence).
17. Several jurisdictions maintain that the rule promotes family harmony. See, e.g., Bums v.
Bums, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950); Holman v.
Holman, 73 Ga. App. 205, 35 S.E.2d 923 (1945); Smith v. Southern Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co.,
247 La. 695, 174 So. 2d 122 (1965); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965);
Smith v. Smith, 240 Pa. Super. Ct. 97, 361 A.2d 756 (1976); Lillienkamp v. Rippetoe, 133 Tenn.
57, 179 S.W. 628 (1915); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389 (1963).
Critics of the family harmony argument have pointed out the inconsistency of allowing prop-
erty, divorce, and criminal actions, but denying personal injury actions. See, e.g., Cramer v.
Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963); Self v. Self, 58 Cal. 2d 683, 376 P.2d 65, 26 Cal. Rptr. 97
(1962); Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974); Brooks v. Robinson,
259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Courtney v.
Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973);
Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, - W. Va. _, 244 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
Critics also have observed that in most cases family harmony was destroyed before the action
was commenced. See, e.g., Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Rogers v. Yellowstone
Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951
(1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). See generally 1 F. HARPER & F.
JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 646 (1956); W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 863; McCurdy, Personal
Injury, supra note 4, at 336; Comment, supra note 9, at 160; Comment, Lewis v. Lewis: Dissolving
the "Metaphysical" Merger in Interspousal Torts, 12 NEw ENG. L. REV. 333, 355 (1977); 19
DEPAUL L. REv. 590, 597 (1970).
18. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774
(Fla. 1950) (en banc); Immer v. Risko, 56 N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970) (Francis, J., dissenting).
But see Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Mosier v. Carney,
376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App.
1973). See generally Ashdown, Intrafamily Immunity, Pure Compensation, and the Family Exclu-
sion Clause, 60 IowA L. REV. 239, 247 (1974); McCurdy, Torts, supra note 4, at 1053.
19. Courts supporting the rule often assert that it prevents fraud. See, e.g., Thompson v.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol59/iss1/19
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courts assert that alternative remedies, such as criminal or divorce pro-
ceedings, are adequate to deal with interspousal torts.20 Other courts
argue that judicial intervention would intrude on the legislature's prov-
ince if the courts alter the longstanding public policy against inter-
spousal tort suits.2 '
Many jurisdictions, responding to the harshness of a denial of com-
pensation to an injured party, have abolished or developed exceptions
Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910); Bums v. Bums, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974); Raisen v.
Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979); Lyons v. Lyons, 2 Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965);
Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287 P.2d 572 (1955); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384
P.2d 389 (1963).
Critics of the fraud argument contend that the judicial system is adequate to detect fraud. See,
e.g., Rogers v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97 Idaho 14, 539 P.2d 566 (1974); Brooks v. Robinson, 259
Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Beaudette v. Frana,
285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974);
Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1973); Digby v. Digby, - R.I. - 388 A.2d I
(1978); Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183,
500 P.2d 771 (1972); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, - W. Va. _ 244 S.E.2d 338 (1978).
Critics also have argued that the problem of fraud is not unique to interspousal suits. See, e.g.,
Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 376 P.2d 701, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962); Brown v. Gosser, 262
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953); Rupert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Immer v. Risko, 56
N.J. 482, 267 A.2d 481 (1970); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1973);
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938); Digby v. Digby, - R.I. _ 388 A.2d 1
(1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972). See generally W. PROSSER, supra
note 4, at 337; Comment, supra note 9, at 161; Comment, supra note 17, at 341; 19 DEPAUL L.
REV. 50, 597 (1970).
20. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 218 U.S. 611 (1910) (divorce and alimony); Mims v.
Mims, 305 So. 2d 787 (Fla. App. 1974) (divorce); Austin v. Austin, 136 Miss. 61, 100 So. 591 (1924)
(divorce and criminal actions). Contra, Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917) (di-
vorce, alimony, and criminal not sufficient); Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343
(1965) (divorce and alimony not sufficient); Merenoff v. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951
(1978) (criminal, divorce, and private sanctions not sufficient); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506
P.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1973) (divorce and criminal not sufficient); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516,
105 S.E. 206 (1920) (criminal not sufficient); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771
(1972) (divorce and criminal not sufficient); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, - W. Va. ._, 244 S.E.2d
338 (1978) (divorce and criminal not sufficient).
21. See, e.g., Bums v. Bums, 111 Ariz. 178, 526 P.2d 717 (1974); Saunders v. Hill, 57 Del.
519, 202 A.2d 807 (1964); Fisher v. Toler, 194 Kan. 701, 401 P.2d 1012 (1965); McNeal v. McNeal,
254 So. 2d 521 (Miss. 1971); Brauner v. Brauner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959); Lyons v. Lyons, 2
Ohio St. 2d 243, 208 N.E.2d 533 (1965); Rubalcava v. Gisseman, 14 Utah 2d 344, 384 P.2d 389
(1963). Modem courts are generally willing to change the rule. See, e.g., Brooks v. Robinson, 259
Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969); Ru-
pert v. Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Flores v. Flores, 84 N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct.
App. 1973); Digby v. Digby, - R.I. __ 388 A.2d 1 (1978); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500
P.2d 771 (1972).
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to the interspousal tort immunity rule.22  Courts have refused to apply
the rule to torts that occurred prior to marriage,2 3 suits begun after
divorce, 4 cases involving motor vehicle negligence,2 5 or intentional
torts.
26
A Maine court first addressed interspousal tort immunity for per-
sonal injury in Abbott v. Abbott. 7 In Abbott a husband assaulted and
falsely imprisoned his wife. She brought suit after the couple's divorce.
The court, citing common-law unity and public policy considerations,
adopted the English common-law rule of interspousal tort immunity.28
The court reasoned that the wife had an adequate alternative remedy in
either a criminal or divorce action. 29 The court found that interspousal
22. See, e.g., Johnson v. Johnson, 201 Ala. 41, 77 So. 335 (1917) (assault and battery);
Cramer v. Cramer, 379 P.2d 95 (Alaska 1963) (automobile negligence); Katzenbach v. Katzen-
bach, 183 Ark. 626, 37 S.W.2d 696 (1931) (automobile negligence); Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692,
376 P.2d 70, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1962) (negligent maintenance of boat deck); Rains v. Rains, 97
Colo. 19, 46 P.2d 740 (1935) (automobile negligence); Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889
(1914) (assault and battery); Lorang v. Hays, 69 Idaho 440, 209 P.2d 733 (1949) (false arrest and
false imprisonment); Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 284 N.E.2d 794 (1972) (automobile negli-
gence); Brown v. Gosser, 262 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. 1953) (automobile negligence); Hosko v. Hosko,
385 Mich. 39, 187 N.W.2d 236 (1971) (automobile negligence); Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366,
173 N.W.2d 416 (1969) (automobile negligence); Gilman v. Gilman, 78 N.H. 4, 95 A. 657 (1915)
(assault); Merenoffv. Merenoff, 76 N.J. 535, 388 A.2d 951 (1978) (negligent use of hedge trimmer);
Maestas v. Overton, 87 N.M. 213, 531 P.2d 947 (1975) (aircraft negligence); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Westlake, 35 N.Y.2d 587, 324 N.E.2d 137, 365 N.Y.S.2d 482 (1974) (automobile
negligence); Crowell v. Crowell, 180 N.C. 516, 105 S.E. 206 (1920) (infection with venereal dis-
ease); Fitzmaurice v. Fitzmaurice, 62 N.D. 191, 242 N.W. 526 (1932) (automobile negligence);
Courtney v. Courtney, 184 Okla. 395, 87 P.2d 660 (1938) (automobile negligence); Prosser v. Pros-
ser, 114 S.C. 45, 102 S.E. 787 (1920) (willful beating); Scotvold v. Scotvold, 68 S.D. 53, 298 N.W.
266 (1941) (automobile negligence); Freehe v. Freehe, 81 Wash. 2d 183, 500 P.2d 771 (1972) (neg-
ligent maintenance of a tractor); Coffindaffer v. Coffindaffer, - W. Va. _ 244 S.E.2d 338 (1978)
(automobile negligence); Zelinger v. State Sand & Gravel Co., 38 Wis. 2d 98, 156 N.W.2d 466
(1968) (automobile negligence).
23. See, e.g., Gaston v. Pittman, 224 So. 2d 326 (Fla. 1969); Packenhram v. Miltmore, 89 Ill.
App. 2d 452, 232 N.E.2d 42 (1967); O'Grady v. Potts, 193 Kan. 644, 396 P.2d 285 (1964); Hamilton
v. Fulkerson, 285 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1955); Childress v. Childress, 569 S.W.2d 816 (Tenn. 1978).
24. See, e.g., Windauer v. O'Conner, 107 Ariz. 267, 485 P.2d 1157 (1971); Grenmillion v.
Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1954); Turner v. Turner, 487 Pa. 403, 409 A.2d 412 (1979).
25. See, e.g., Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976); Rupert v. Stienne, 90
Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974); Digby v. Digby, - R.I. _, 388 A.2d 1 (1978); Richard v. Richard,
131 Vt. 98. 300 A.2d 637 (1973).
26. See, e.g., Lusby v. Lusby, 283 Md. 334, 390 A.2d 77 (1978); Apitz v. Dames, 205 Or. 242,
287 P.2d 585 (1955); Bounds v. Caudle, 560 S.W.2d 925 (Tex. 1977).
27. 67 Me. 304 (1877).
28. Id at 307.
29. Id
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tort suits might impair family harmony,30 create a flood of litigation,3'
and destroy the finality of divorce actions.32 The Maine courts also
have refused to allow suits between husband and wife on promissory
notes,33 misuse of trust funds, 34 costs in defending a suit, 35 personal
services, 3 6 and negligent use of an automobile.37
In 1963 the Maine courts began to move away slowly from the inter-
spousal tort immunity rule. In Bedall v. Reagan 8 the court held that a
third party could implead a husband in a suit instituted by his wife.
The court reasoned that the public policy of compensating those
harmed by others outweighed policy considerations inherent in the in-
terspousal tort immunity rule.39
Ten years later, a Maine court created a second exception to the in-
terspousal tort immunity rule. In Moulton v. Moulton41 the court al-
lowed a wife to sue her husband for a tort, which occurred before their
marriage. The court reasoned that the parties' knowledge of the exist-
ence of the tort at marriage ameliorated the danger to family har-
mony.41 Moulton also rejected the risk of fraudulent suits as a serious
countervailing policy factor.42
In MacDonald v. MacDonald4 3 the court decided that changes in so-
cial conditions since Abbott 4 rendered the common-law doctrine of in-
terspousal tort immunity obsolete.45 The court reaffirmed the Bedal 46
and Moulton47 reasoning that the harm of leaving a wrong uncompen-
sated outweighed the possibility of domestic discord.48 The court re-
30. Id at 308.
31. Id
32. Id
33. Perkins v. Blether, 107 Me. 473, 78 A. 574 (1911) (husband immune to suit from third
party assignee of wife's note); Crowther v. Crowther, 55 Me. 358 (1868).
34. Anthony v. Anthony, 135 Me. 54, 188 A. 724 (1937).
35. Smith v. Gorman, 41 Me. 405 (1856).
36. Copp v. Copp, 103 Me. 51, 68 A. 458 (1907).
37. Sacknoff v. Sacknoff, 131 Me. 280, 161 A. 669 (1932) (reaffirming unity doctrine).
38. 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963).
39. Id at 297, 192 A.2d at 26.
40. 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973).
41. Id at 229.
42. Id
43. 412 A.2d 71 (Me. 1980).
44. 67 Me. 304 (1877).
45. 412 A.2d at 72.
46. 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 224 (1963).
47. 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973).
48. 412 A.2d at 73 (citing Bedall v. Reagan, 159 Me. 292, 192 A.2d 24 (1963)).
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jected the risk of fraudulent suits as a rationale for retaining the rule by
finding that the judicial system can detect most fraudulent suits. 49 The
MacDonald court also contended, as in Bedall and Moulton, that the
courts have an affirmative duty to update prior holdings.5"
MacDonald justifiably rejects the public policy arguments tradition-
ally advanced to support the interspousal tort immunity rule. The poli-
cies of protecting family harmony,5  and limiting frivolous5 2 or
fraudulent53 suits are not adequate to justify its retention.
Allowance of interspousal tort suits will not seriously harm family
harmony. In many cases family harmony already has been destroyed
by the date that suit is filed.54 All states allow actions between spouses
on property-related torts with no apparent adverse effect on spousal
relations.5 5 In addition, most interpousal tort suits arise out of the neg-
ligent use of an automobile. The almost universal existence of automo-
bile liability insurance assures that most interspousal suits actually will
be maintained between a spouse and an insurance company, thus limit-
ing the risk of disturbing family harmony. 6
Allowing interspousal tort suits will not increase the number of frivo-
lous suits, although spouses may bring suit on common and unimpor-
tant occurrences. 57  Courts, however, can detect frivolous suits
regardless of the relationship between the parties.58 Furthermore, in
those states that have abrogated the interspousal immunity rule, frivo-
49. Id (citing Moulton v. Moulton, 309 A.2d 224 (Me. 1973)).
50. 412 A.2d at 74 (citing Lewis v. Lewis, 370 Mass. 619, 351 N.E.2d 526 (1976)).
51. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
52. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
53. See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
54. See Brown v. Brown, 88 Conn. 42, 89 A. 889 (1914); Roger v. Yellowstone Park Co., 97
Idaho 14, 593 P.2d 566 (1974).
55. See Richard v. Richard, 131 Vt. 98, 300 A.2d 637 (1973).
56. See id. Some courts and scholars have expressed a concern that any decrease in the risk
of disturbing family harmony created by insurance is accompanied by an increase in the risk of
fraud. See, e.g., Raisen v. Raisen, 379 So. 2d 352 (Fla. 1979); Smith v. Smith, 205 Or. 286, 287
P.2d 572 (1955); Ashdown, supra note 18, at 249.
Courts that have abrogated the interspousal immunity rule contend that fraud is not unique to
interspousal suits and that the judicial system can detect fraud. See note 19 supra and accompa-
nying text. On the effects of insurance, see generally Ashdown, supra note 18; James, Accident
Liability Reconsidered- The Impact of Liability Insurance, 57 YALE L.J. 549 (1948).
57. See Corren v. Corren, 47 So. 2d 774 (Fla. 1950) (en banc) (indicating relationship be-
tween frivolous suits and family harmony).
58. See Ashdown, supra note 18. Ashdown states that "the frivolous suit argument presents
no substantial difficulties since behavior which might otherwise be deemed to provide adequate
grounds for imposing liability is often simply not 'unreasonable' when viewed in the context of a
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lous suits have not posed a significant problem to the courts. 59
Although abrogation of interspousal tort immunity may increase the
risk of fraudulent suits, courts regularly must discern the fraudulent
nature of many types of suits.6" The risk of fraud, therefore, does not
justify denying compensation to an entire class of litigants.6
Alternative remedies are inadequate forms of compensation for an
injured spouse.62 Alimony is intended only to discharge a duty of sup-
port, not to compensate tort victims.63 Criminal sanctions deal solely
with a public wrong,' providing no compensation for the victim.
Judicial abrogation of interspousal tort immunity rules will not con-
flict with legislative preeminence in public policymaking.65 Because
courts promulgated most interspousal tort immunity rules,66 they
clearly enjoy the power and the duty to change these outmoded rules.67
The MacDonald decision is a step forward in modernizing the tort
law field. Interspousal tort immunity is no longer appropriate because
it frustrates the societal goal of compensating those harmed by others
while contributing only slightly to the goals of protecting family har-
mony and limiting frivolous or fraudulent suits.
family relationship." Id. at 247. See also W. PROSSER, supra note 4, at 863; McCurdy, Torts,
supra note 4, at 1035.
59. See Klein v. Klein, 58 Cal. 2d 692, 694, 376 P.2d 70, 72, 26 Cal. Rptr. 102, 104 (1962).
60. Id
61. Id
62. See, e.g., Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 138 N.W.2d 343 (1965); Flores v. Flores, 84
N.M. 601, 506 P.2d 345 (Ct. App. 1973).
63. 376 Mich. at 547, 138 N.W.2d at 346.
64. 84 N.M. at 603, 506 P.2d at 347.
65. See, e.g., Digby v. Digby, - R.I. _ 388 A.2d 1 (1978).
66. See, e.g., Brauner v. Brauner, 327 S.W.2d 808 (Mo. 1959).
67. In Digby v. Digby the Rhode Island Supreme Court stated, "[W]e abdicate our own func-
tion, in a field peculiarly nonstatutory, when we refuse to consider a court-made rule." - R.I. at
- 388 A.2d at 2. Accord, Brooks v. Robinson, 259 Ind. 16, 23, 284 N.E.2d 794, 796 (1972)
("[c]ourt should not hesitate to alter, amend or abrogate the common law"); Lewis v. Lewis, 370
Mass. 619, 628, 351 N.E.2d 526, 531 (1976) ("a court not only has the authority but also the duty to
reexamine its precedents"); Mosier v. Carney, 376 Mich. 532, 543, 138 N.W.2d 343, 344 (1965) ("it
is our duty to reexamine it and, if necessary to avoid continuing injustice, to change it"); Rubert v.
Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 399, 528 P.2d 1013, 1014 (1974) ("the doctrine is subject to amendment,
modification, and abrogation if current conditions so dictate").
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